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Tribal Sovereignty and Tobacco Control in
State-Tribe Cigarette Compacts
Compacts are powerful legal tools that states and tribes can use to
negotiate agreements. One of the most interesting examples of state-tribe
compacts is the cigarette compact, which is useful in combating the illicit
cigarette trade. This Note argues that tribal leaders and states can more
effectively reach this goal by (1) recognizing tribal sovereignty in and (2)
keeping tobacco control at the heart of compact discussions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Leslie Thompson, an executive of tobacco behemoth
R.J. Reynolds, pled guilty to money laundering. 1 His offense: helping
American smugglers gain access to the tobacco company’s Canadian
cigarettes through the St. Regis Mohawk Indian reservation. 2
Thompson, of course, was not the only individual convicted in this
operation. Other individuals, including at least one Native American,
had previously been convicted for their involvement in the
international black-market scheme as well. 3
This kind of international smuggling activity is just one example
of illicit cigarette trading in the United States. 4 Other individuals, for

1. RJR Executive Helped Smugglers Sell Cigarettes Illegally in Canada, WALL STREET J.
(Mar. 26, 1999, 11:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB92245673715819645
[hereinafter RJR Executive].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
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example, try to avoid state or federal cigarette taxes by buying
cigarettes from low-cost tribes, states, or countries and then selling
them to residents of high-tax locations without paying the tax
differentials. 5 Once in these higher-tax locations, these cigarettes can
either be used by the purchaser or resold at lower prices than locally
taxed cigarettes. 6 Individuals can also become involved in illicit
cigarette dealings by selling cigarettes to those who are not authorized
to purchase them (for example, Native American retailers selling state
tax-exempt cigarettes to nontribe members). 7
With cigarette taxes higher than $3.50 per pack in some states and
lower than $0.50 in others, 8 vendors who sell low-tax cigarettes to
residents of high-tax locations stand to pocket a significant profit.
Reporter Christopher Mathias explains:
If [a New York] bodega owner were to go about [selling cigarettes]
the legal way, buying a pack of cigarettes at the wholesale price of
$12.50, then retailing that pack for $13, he [would] only make[] 50
cents profit. Each pack of cigarettes smuggled from out of state
wholesales for about $5.50. The store owner can still sell those packs
for $12.50. But suddenly, he’s making a $7 profit. 9

Because involvement in this kind of operation can lead to jail time
and heavy fines, the risk of getting caught in this lucrative trade
should, in theory, be high enough to deter certain types of illicit
cigarette trading. 10 However, the difficulty of tracking down
5. See id.
6. Christopher Mathias, Inside New York City’s Dangerous, MultimillionDollar Cigarette Black Market, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2014, 8:51 AM), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2014/04/03/cigarette-smuggling-new-york-_n_5041823.html. See generally
Michael F. Lovenheim, How Far to the Border?: The Extent and Impact of Cross-Border Casual
Cigarette Smuggling, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 7 (2008) (discussing cigarette tax differentials along
state borders).
7. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., UNDERSTANDING THE U.S.
ILLICIT TOBACCO MARKET: CHARACTERISTICS, POLICY CONTEXT, AND LESSONS FROM
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 55–56 (Peter Reuter & Malay Majmundar eds., 2015)
[hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL] (discussing the legal issues surrounding cigarette sales
on tribal lands to non-Native Americans).
8. Ann Boonn, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCOFREE KIDS (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/
0097.pdf [hereinafter Boonn, Tax Rates].
9. Mathias, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., Fourteen People Indicted on Charges Involving a Bootleg Cigarette Scheme,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmo/pr/fourteen-
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bootleggers has made that risk less menacing, and consequently, illicit
cigarette markets continue to exist. 11 According to a 2014 Tax
Foundation report, over half of the cigarette market in New York and
Arizona is bootlegged, as well as over a quarter of the cigarette market
in twelve other states. 12
There is a growing movement among government leaders and
public health groups to end these kinds of illicit cigarette dealings, and
for good reason—such dealings can cause major economic and public
health problems. On the financial side, for example, it was reported in
2011 that cigarette bootleggers were pocketing $525 million each
year that were supposed to go to the state of New York. 13 Meanwhile,
selling low-cost cigarettes in high-tax areas has likely helped hook and
keep vulnerable populations, like low-income adults and teenagers,
addicted to smoking. 14
Government officials are using a variety of techniques to deal with
the illicit cigarette trade issue, many of which involve specific
legislation or multi-state negotiation tactics. However, this problem
must also be addressed along the borders of some Native American
tribal lands: a task that has proven difficult. 15 Although Native
Americans do not pay state taxes on cigarettes, they can be required
to force non-Native Americans—and even Native Americans who
belong to other tribes—to purchase cigarettes on tribal land at state
tax rates. 16 However, political tensions between states and tribes are

people-indicted-charges-involving-bootleg-cigarette-scheme (“If convicted, conspiracy to traffic
in contraband cigarettes and money laundering carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison,
and/or a fine up to $250,000; each count of trafficking in contraband cigarettes carries a
maximum of five years in prison and/or fines up to $250,000; each count of money laundering
carries a maximum of 20 years in prison and/or fines up to $500,000.”).
11. Mathias, supra note 6.
12. Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Scott Drenkard, Cigarette Taxes and Cigarette
Smuggling by State, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 19, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/cigarettetaxes-and-cigarette-smuggling-state.
13. Mathias, supra note 6.
14. See Kevin C. Davis et al., Cigarette Trafficking in Five Northeastern US Cities, 23
TOBACCO CONTROL e62, e66 (2014) (“We estimate that in NYC the effective price per pack
would increase by as much as $2.90 if trafficking was eliminated and would result in decreases
in youth and adult smoking.”).
15. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 56.
16. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
153–59 (1980).
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strong, 17 and state governments have limited authority to enforce state
taxes on tribal land, 18 so this does not always happen. Some Native
Americans smuggle low-cost cigarettes across international borders
that are then sold in high-tax locations. 19 Others sell cigarettes online
to non-Native American residents without adding applicable state
taxes. 20 And, in other cases, tribal retailers sell cigarettes on their land
to nonresidents state-tax free. 21
One approach to combating the illicit cigarette market is to bring
state and tribal governments to the negotiating table to develop a
solution that works for both parties. The result of these negotiations
often comes in the form of a special intergovernmental contract
known as a “compact.” 22 Compacts have been used to finalize statetribe negotiations on a variety of issues—from water rights23 to casino
rights 24—and compacts for cigarette taxes work in a similar manner.
As a legal tool, cigarette compacts have the potential to make cigarette
taxation more consistent across borders and protect economic and
health interests among both Native Americans and non-Native
Americans. And, in fact, evidence suggests that at least some cigarette
compacts are helping curb illicit cigarette dealings on tribal land. 25

17. See, e.g., Catherine Thorbecke, Tensions Mount as Native American Tribe Fights to
Block Oil Pipeline, ABC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:44 PM), http://abcnews.go
.com/US/tensions-mount-native-american-tribe-fights-block-oil/story?id= 41891717.
18. FRANK J. CHALOUPKA ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND
HEALTH PROMOTION, PREVENTING AND REDUCING ILLICIT TOBACCO TRADE IN THE
UNITED STATES 34 (2015) (“[J]urisdictional issues can make it difficult for states to enforce tax
collection on nonmembers or non-Native Americans who purchase tobacco on tribal lands.”).
19. See, e.g., RJR Executive, supra note 1.
20. Despite Law, Tribe Sells 1.7 Tons of Cigarettes Online, N.Y. POST (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:11
AM) (quoting Nativeblend.net), http://nypost.com/2013/12/02/despite-law-tribe-sells-17-tons-of-cigarettes-online/ .
21. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 56.
22. See Compact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An agreement or
covenant between two or more parties, esp. between governments or states.”).
23. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Pelphrey, Oklahoma’s State/Tribal Water Compact: Three Cheers
for Compromise, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 127 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Rubin Ranat, Note, Tribal-State Compacts: Legitimate or Illegal Taxation of
Indian Gaming in California?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 953 (2005).
25. In one Washington State study, for example, authors concluded that: “Enforcement,
tobacco control policies, and compacts with Indian tribes are among the factors that have kept
illegal sales in check.” STEPHEN D. SMITH & VAN HUYNH, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF REVENUE,
WASHINGTON STATE CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION REVISITED 12 (2007), https://dor.wa.gov/

1265

6.SLOAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/12/2018 10:53 AM

2017

In practice, however, these kinds of compacts are sometimes
written in ways that frustrate their greater potential as legal and
political instruments. Ideally, cigarette compacts bring tribes and
states together as allies to curb illicit cigarette dealings. However,
cigarette compacts sometimes (1) treat tribal groups as unequal
partners in the negotiating process or (2) fail to dedicate cigarette tax
funds to smoking prevention and control.
A recent compact between the Cherokee Nation and the State of
Oklahoma26 provides a good example of these two phenomena. Parts
of the compact’s recitals seem to show slight disrespect for tribal
sovereignty. 27 While the compact recognizes tribal sovereignty, it also
declares that the powers of the tribal government have been
recognized by the federal government as merely “extant” 28 and asserts
state authority to pull taxes from cigarettes sold on nontribal land.29
There is also no mention of financial earmarking for tobacco control
in the compact. 30
These two issues do not necessarily make cigarette compacts
ineffective—just less effective than they potentially could be. 31 It is
sites/default/files/legacy/Docs/reports/CigStudyJan11_2007.pdf. Data on the effectiveness
of cigarette compacts appear to be limited.
26. Tobacco Tax Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the Cherokee Nation
(filed Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/89635.pdf [hereinafter
Tobacco Tax Compact].
27. See id. art. 1, at 1–2.
28. Id. One of the definitions of “extant” in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, and likely
the one intended here, is “still existing: not destroyed or lost.” Extant, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extant (last visited Nov. 27, 2017).
In the words of one author, a federal court once described tribal sovereignty as “extant unless
that power is divested by Act of Congress or treaty” MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 244 (2016).
29. Tobacco Tax Compact, supra note 26, art. I, at 2.
30. Id. at 1–11.
31. It should be noted that there does not appear to be data specifically on the impact of
including public health and tribal considerations in cigarette compacts on the illicit cigarette
trade. The purpose of this Note is not to prove empirically that these two considerations work
but that they are logical avenues for strengthening current compacts. Moreover, when a
cigarette compact that happens to incorporate these two elements is shown to be associated with
tribal compacting, many other factors, like the previously existing relationship between the state
and tribe, other smoking interventions, and the tribe’s enforcement capacity, may also be at play.
Therefore, any data used to support these assertions should be interpreted with caution.
However, robust data collection and future scholarship on the usefulness of adding these
measures to currently existing compacts would provide welcomed valuable insight into this
subject matter.
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logical to assume that when tribes are treated as full allies in a cigarette
compact negotiation, they are more likely to make mutually beneficial
agreements and follow through on their compact obligations. 32 It is
also logical to assume that when funds from cigarette taxes are
funneled back into effective tobacco prevention and control initiatives,
the proportion of the population interested in smoking—and, by
extension, in undertaxed cigarettes—will likely shrink. 33 Therefore,
when a compact (1) fully considers tribal sovereignty and (2) earmarks
proceeds for tobacco prevention and control, it becomes a more
powerful compact, at least as far as combating the illicit cigarette trade
is concerned.
The three purposes of this Note are to (1) explain in greater depth
why tribal sovereignty and tobacco control are such helpful
components in state-tribe cigarette compact negotiations; (2) show
how these two elements have been ignored in some state-tribe
cigarette compacts; and (3) suggest techniques to incorporate both
elements more fully in those agreements. Part II will describe the
foundations of cigarette tax law and the specific cigarette trade issues
that pertain to tribal land. Part III will discuss the variety of tools states
have used to address the problem, including compacts. Part IV will
explain why incorporating tribal sovereignty and public health into
negotiations has the potential to improve compact effectiveness and
will also analyze the use of those themes in two recent Kansas
compacts. Part V will make specific recommendations on how tribal
sovereignty and public welfare considerations can be more effectively
included in tribal compacting schemes. Part VI will conclude.

32. See, e.g., SUSAN JOHNSON ET AL., GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT MODELS OF
COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND TRIBES 4 (2009) (“State-tribal cooperation can be key to
achieving improved government services.”).
33. See, e.g., David T. Levy, Frank Chaloupka & Joseph Gitchell, The Effects of Tobacco
Control Policies on Smoking Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. &
PRAC. 338 (2004) (describing the impact of various tobacco control strategies on smoking rates
in the United States). Tobacco control strategies might need to be specifically targeted to the
population of smokers interested in illicit cigarettes to have this kind of impact.
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II. CIGARETTE TAXES AND NATIVE AMERICAN LAND
A. Foundations of the Cigarette Tax
Between the late 1800s and early 1920s, long before the first
epidemiological studies found associations between lung cancer and
cigarette use in the 1930s, 34 at least fourteen states and Canada
decided to ban cigarette sales. 35 The ban was not entirely rooted in
health but in the perceived immorality of smoking, which, along with
drinking and gambling, was considered a vice by members of the
Progressive movement. 36
Although these restrictions were lifted in the United States during
the 1920s, 37 the negative public perception of cigarettes was never
permanently stubbed out. Starting before the Second World War and
continuing through the 1960s, epidemiologists, animal researchers,
cellular pathologists, and chemists started to build a consensus in
global research about the detrimental health effects of smoking. 38 This
evidence, likely coupled with the popular philosophy that goods
taxation was an appropriate way to generate government income,39
provided a foundation for the development of cigarette taxes in the
United States in the later twentieth century.
Today, cigarette tax rates are ubiquitous in our country, although
state cigarette taxes vary widely. 40 According to one recent report,
North Dakota taxes its residents at $0.44 per pack, while its neighbor

34. Robert N. Proctor, The History of the Discovery of the Cigarette—Lung Cancer Link:
Evidentiary Traditions, Corporate Denial, Global Toll, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 87, 87–
88 (2012).
35. Compare FRITZ L. LAUX & STEFANIE D. BUCKSKIN, AN OKLAHOMA HISTORY OF
CIGARETTE TAXATION 4 (2015) (citing MAURINE BROWN NEUBERGER, SMOKE SCREEN:
TOBACCO AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE 52 (1963)), http://tobacconomics.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/08/Laux_OKTribal_08-24-15.pdf, with Lee J. Alston, Ruth Dupré & Tomas
Nonnenmacher, Social Reformers and Regulation: The Prohibition of Cigarettes in the United
States and Canada, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 425, 426 (2002) (listing fifteen states
and Canada as banning cigarettes around that time).
36. Alston, Dupré & Nonnenmacher, supra note 35, at 426.
37. LAUX & BUCKSKIN, supra note 35.
38. Proctor, supra note 34.
39. See, e.g., Devin A. Rheaume, A Growing Sin-dustry: The History and Effects of
Cigarette Excise Taxation and Regulation in the United States 3–4 (unpublished honors theses,
University of New Hampshire, Paper No. 263), http://scholars.unh.edu/honors/263/.
40. Boonn, Tax Rates, supra note 8, at 1.
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to the east, Minnesota, taxes its residents at $3.04 per pack.41
Meanwhile, the local and state combined tax rate in Chicago for a pack
of cigarettes runs at a steep $6.16. 42 Despite this geographic variation
in state tax rates, however, cigarettes on the whole have been described
as some of the highest-taxed commodities in our country, along with
alcohol, guns, plane tickets, and gasoline. 43 Currently, state taxes on
cigarettes average $1.71 per pack, while the federal government slaps
on an additional $1.01 per pack. 44
Some may argue that these cigarette taxes exist today simply to
produce increased revenue for the government. However, while
revenue generation is clearly a strong motivator for any type of tax,
and the health burden of cigarette smoking certainly adds persuasive
merit to that request for additional revenue, 45 the extremely high rate
of cigarette taxes in our country suggests that there may be another
powerful trigger behind these laws.
According to economists, anti-smoking advocates, and the
tobacco industry itself, cigarette taxes reduce smoking rates. 46 In fact,
the higher taxes are, the more effective taxes become at deterring
smoking behavior. According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids,
“The general consensus is that nationally, every 10 percent increase in
the real price of cigarettes reduces . . . smoking among young adults
by about 3.5 percent, reduces the number of kids who smoke by six
or seven percent, and reduces overall cigarette consumption by
approximately three to five percent.” 47
Some states take this anti-smoking incentive even further by
earmarking tax revenues for anti-smoking initiatives. Under
Proposition 99, for example, the State of California dedicated a

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Helen Harvey, What Are Some of the Highest Taxed Items?, SAPLING (May 8, 2011),
https://www.sapling.com/8377758/highest-taxed-items.
44. Boonn, Tax Rates, supra note 8, at 1.
45. Laura Bach, Toll of Tobacco in the United States of America, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact
sheets/pdf/0072.pdf.
46. Ann Boonn, Raising Cigarette Taxes Reduces Smoking, Especially Among Kids (and
the Cigarette Companies Know It), CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1–2 (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0146.pdf.
47. Id. at 1.
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quarter of those tax revenues to tobacco control and research. 48
Tobacco control earmarking is important for two reasons: First, it
works. Research has consistently shown that tobacco control initiatives
can have a powerful impact on smoking prevalence. 49 Second, when
funds are earmarked for tobacco control rather than unrelated
services, like roads or schools, states have an incentive to see smoking
rates drop. 50
Considering the steepness of cigarette taxes in some areas of the
country and the rationale behind those taxes, it is easy to understand
why cigarette vendors might try to keep the industry alive by
circumventing the tax system. These vendors thwart key purposes of
cigarette taxes by helping new smokers become addicted to cigarettes,
keeping experienced smokers addicted, and denying states needed
revenue that can be used to address associated public health costs. In
other words, illicit cigarette dealings prevent cigarette tax increases
from supporting tobacco prevention and control efforts.
B. Illicit Cigarette Dealings on Native American Land
The tension between Native American tribes and states on
cigarette tax issues must be addressed in order to combat the illicit
cigarette trade. Today, 567 federally recognized tribes dot our
country, 51 with tribal land scattered across the majority of states. 52

48. Frank J. Chaloupka, Ayda Yurekli & Geoffrey T. Fong, Tobacco Taxes as a Tobacco
Control Strategy, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 172, 175 (2012).
49. See, e.g., Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Impact of Tobacco Control Programs on Adult
Smoking, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 304, 308–09 (2008) (“[There has been] extensive research
demonstrating the effectiveness of state tobacco control programs . . . . [Our] findings
strengthen the evidence that state tobacco control programs reduce adult smoking prevalence
and have an effect that is independent of increased cigarette prices. The results also show that
funding for such programs is a valuable investment. By not sufficiently funding programs at least
at the CDC recommended minimum levels, states are missing an opportunity to substantially
reduce smoking-related mortality, morbidity, and economic costs.”).
50. See generally Caroline May, What Would a Smoke-Free America Cost the Government?,
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 28, 2011, 1:05 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/28/what-wouldan-america-without-smokers-cost/.
51. About Us, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/about-us
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
52. Hillary DeLong et al., Common State Mechanisms Regulating Tribal Tobacco
Taxation and Sales, the USA, 2015, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL i32, i32 (2016), http://tobacco
control.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/25/Suppl_1/i32.full.pdf.
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Over centuries of legislation and litigation, 53 these tribal groups have
established themselves as largely self-governing bodies, with some
powers rivaling those of states. 54 When it comes to cigarette sales on
reservations, tribe members are exempt from paying state taxes for
cigarettes 55 and have authority to impose their own taxes for cigarettes
sold on their land. 56 However, cigarettes sold on tribal land often cost
much less than state-taxed cigarettes. 57
Of course, federal law expressly permits only local tribe members to
purchase cigarettes free of state tax on tribal land. 58 In fact, even selling
tax-free products from reservations to nontribe members online is
prohibited under the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act of
2009. 59 Despite these legal restrictions, as in most black-market
industries, finding and enforcing offenders under federal and state law
is difficult. 60 The availability of state tax-exempt cigarettes on tribal
property creates many opportunities for bootlegging. In one New
York study, the percentage of smokers who reported buying cigarettes
from reservations increased in the year following a state cigarette tax
hike. 61 Around the same time, when cigarettes on Washington tribal
land cost about sixty-five percent less than those sold in the rest of the
state, about one-fifth of smokers in the area reported buying

53. See generally Marilyn Phelan, A History and Analysis of Laws Protecting Native
American Cultures, 45 TULSA L. REV. 45 (2009).
54. See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34. It should be noted that tribal
sovereignty differs in some ways from state sovereignty. For example, tribal courts cannot try
nontribe members for crimes committed on reservations. Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian
Land, Criminals Can Get Away with Almost Anything, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2013), http://
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with
-almost-anything/273391/.
55. CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34.
56. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
152–54 (1980).
57. See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 37.
58. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Res., 447 U.S. at 160–61.
59. Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–154, 124 Stat. 1087,
1091 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 376a(a)(3) (2012)).
60. Jon Campbell, Smuggled, Untaxed Cigarettes Are Everywhere in New York City,
VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/smuggled-untaxed-cigare
ttes-are-everywhere-in-new-york-city-6717621. The legality of cigarettes makes enforcement
even more difficult than for other black-market industries. Id.
61. BRETT LOOMIS ET AL., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUNE
2008 $1.25 CIGARETTE TAX INCREASE 3–4 (2010), https://www.health.ny.gov/prevention/
tobacco_control/docs/2010-11-12_tax_increase_topical_report.pdf.
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reservation cigarettes. 62 Some tribal retailers have even taken to selling
their products tax free online, using language like “NO STATE
TAXES, NO REPORTS to anyone EVER and NO Surprise
Tax Bills.” 63
The illicit cigarette trade has been used by some Native Americans
to build financial independence. 64 Moreover, some Native American
businesses feel squeezed out by federal and state taxes and other legal
restrictions on cigarette sales. 65 Meanwhile, some tribes are internally
conflicted about their own participation in the tobacco industry. 66 The
profits from that industry are not always enjoyed equitably among
tribal members. 67 Furthermore, some tribes are openly opposed to
using commercial cigarettes for religious reasons, 68 some tribes are
trying to diversify economically, 69 and others have concerns about
tribal public health. 70
It is in this unsettled, conflicted environment that illicit cigarette
sales are taking place on tribal reservations, both through the internet
and in tribal retail shops. Both states and tribes stand to gain from
initiatives that curb smoking and improve state-tribe relations. The
next part of this Note will describe what states and tribes have been
doing to address the problem of illicit cigarette dealings, including the
use of stamps and compacts.

62. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i32 (presenting statistical information provided by
the U.S. Department of Commerce and National Cancer Institute).
63. Despite Law, Tribe Sells 1.7 Tons of Cigarettes Online, supra note 20.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Kari A. Samuel, Kurt M. Ribisl & Rebecca S. Williams, Internet Cigarette Sales
and Native American Sovereignty: Political and Public Health Contexts, 33 J. PUB. HEALTH
POL’Y 173, 177 (2012).
67. Id.
68. See KEEP IT SACRED NAT’L NATIVE NETWORK, http://keepitsacred.itcmi.org/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2018).
69. See, e.g., PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com
(last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (follow menu icon and click on “Business” tab for various examples
of enterprises).
70. Tribal Public Health Law, NAT’L INDIAN HEALTH BOARD, http://www
.nihb.org/public_health/tribal_public_health_law.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
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III. STATE TACTICS
To combat illicit cigarette dealings involving Native American
retailers, states have the authority to require tribes to sell taxed
cigarettes to nontribe members. 71 With this goal in mind, states have
primarily used two tools to enforce the sale of taxed cigarettes—(1)
state laws and (2) state-tribal agreements or compacts. 72
A. State Cigarette Laws
More than half of states containing tribal land have their own
codified laws governing tribal cigarette sales. 73 These laws provide
tribe members with state-tax free cigarettes purchased on the
reservation while ensuring that states keep their own cigarette tax
revenues. Some of the most common state laws create coupon
systems, cigarette quotas, tax stamps, and refunds. 74
1. Coupons
Coupon systems work by requiring tribes to import taxed
cigarettes while granting tribes coupons to buy cigarettes state-tax
free. 75 In Florida, for example, these coupons pass from the states to
reservation cigarette retailers who then present the coupons to
purchase tax-free cigarettes to wholesale dealers. 76 The program has
advantages and disadvantages; for example, a coupon system may seem
relatively efficient for users, but it is unclear to what extent coupons
are used to benefit only tribal members. 77

71. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
159 (1980) (“The State may validly require . . . the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to
nonmembers of the Tribe.”).
72. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33. Note that the statistics used here are based in
part on a review of laws from 2015, and these data may have changed since then.
73. Id.
74. Id.; CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38.
75. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 210.1801(2) (West 2011).
77. See CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34–35 (criticism of the quota system that
applies to use of coupons).
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2. Quotas
In a quota-based system, tribes receive a certain number of taxfree cigarettes based on estimated tribal consumption and the rest are
taxed. 78 On its own, the quota system is riddled with holes. There is
no way to ensure that only tribal members receive tax-free products,
and tribes may receive more tax-free cigarettes than they need. 79 This
may be why two of the six states using a quota system at the beginning
of 2015 supplemented it with coupons or vouchers. 80
3. Tax stamps
Tax stamps are a common taxed-cigarette enforcement tool that
can be used either alone or in tandem with other plans. Similar to a
coupon system, tax prepayment requires tribes to pay for cigarette
taxes up-front and, in some cases, receive a rebate for the cigarettes
that will be purchased by tribal members. 81 At the beginning of 2015,
twelve states used a tax prepayment system in addition to or in lieu of
tax stamps. 82 Tax stamps can also be used in a variety of ways, such as
on all cigarettes, 83 on cigarettes sorted by tribe, or on cigarettes sorted
by tax method. 84 Utah, for example, applies stamps to tobacco
products sold to nontribe members. 85

78. Id. at 34; Philip DeCicca, Donald Kenkel & Feng Liu, Reservation Prices: An
Economic Analysis of Cigarette Purchases on Indian Reservations 9 (Nat’l Institutes of Health,
Working Paper No. 20778, 2013), http://www.appam.org/assets/1/7/Reservation_
Prices_An_Economic_Analysis_of_Cigarette_Purchases_on_Indian_Reservations.pdf.
79. CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 34–35.
80. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i34 tbl. 2 (see footnote under “Allotment of taxfree tribal tobacco”).
81. Id.
82. Id. at i34.
83. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids recommends affixing a stamp to tax-free
cigarettes as a way to provide government data on tax-free cigarettes and prevent tax-exempt
cigarettes from being sold illegally. State Options to Prevent and Reduce Cigarette Smuggling and
Block Other Illegal State Tobacco Tax Evasion, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 1,
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0274.pdf.
84. See, e.g., CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38; DeLong et al., supra note 52, at
i33–i34.
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-204.5(2)(c)(i) (West 2017); DeLong et al., supra note
52, at i36.
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4. Difficulties with the state and federal law systems
While these state laws have some advantages, they lack the ability
to unify state and tribal governments in addressing the cigarette
bootlegging problem the way state-tribal compacts can. When states
assume that their own or federal law provisions like the PACT Act are
sufficient to stop illicit cigarette dealings, they do so naively. States
cannot enforce such laws alone, and tribes have little incentive to help
states in their enforcement efforts. State and federal cigarette tax laws
place a burden on tribes without tribal consent or benefit.
Understandably, some Native Americans view the imposition of these
state laws as an attack on their tribal right of self-governance. 86
Consequently, states are sometimes left to enforce these laws without
tribal support—a situation that makes it difficult to improve statetribal relations and stamp out the illicit cigarette trade.
The PACT Act, for example, covers online cigarette operations,
but site operators can shut down their websites when discovered and
create others in their place. 87 And even when an online tribal retailer
is caught selling untaxed products out of state, that retailer’s sales to
the state may be so minimal that due process concerns in taxation and
jurisdiction arise. 88 States also face an uphill battle controlling sales of
untaxed cigarettes to nontribal members on tribal property. Hillary
DeLong and colleagues explain, “[S]tates do not have jurisdiction on
tribal lands, and are unable to use the court system to pursue back
taxes. These . . . issues, coupled with a [situation] where some
consumers are tax-exempt while others are not, can make state
collection of taxes owed for tobacco sales to nontribal
consumers difficult.” 89
Tribes may have greater awareness of cigarette sales schemes and
ability to enforce cigarette laws in these situations than states do, but
there is little incentive to do so when operating under a law that the

86. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 166.
87. Brian Hickey, The PACT ACT: Preventing Illegal Internet Sales of Cigarettes &
Smokeless Tobacco, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.
tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0361.pdf.
88. PACT Act, PUB. HEALTH & TOBACCO POL’Y CTR., http://tobaccopolicycenter.org
/tobacco-control/recent-cases/pact-act/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
89. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i32.
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tribe did not help create and may not support. 90 As Kari Samuel and
colleagues explain: “[A]ny successful strategy to control Native
tobacco sales will probably emerge from agreements negotiated
between tribal and state governments rather than external attempts to
regulate such sales directly.” 91
B. Compacts
Compacts are generally superior to state laws as tools for
strengthening relations between tribes and states. These special
agreements have been used to resolve issues related to casinos between
tribes and states for some time. 92 Such agreements can also prove
helpful in curbing the illicit cigarette trade.
Compacts do this by placing trust in tribes as sovereign partners. 93
When a state engages in compact negotiations with a tribe, the state
shows that it values tribal authority and that it wants to create an
agreement that benefits both parties. Moreover, while state laws may
include a tax revenue sharing component, 94 revenue sharing or
collecting is a common feature in compacts. 95 Doing so reduces tax
differentials between states and tribes and returns tax revenue to the
tribal government, sometimes for health programs. 96 This type of
agreement incentivizes tribes to enforce tax provisions themselves and
regulate on-reservation manufactured cigarettes that cannot be
enforced with quotas, stamps, or refunds. 97

90. See, e.g., Kari A. Samuel, Kurt M. Ribisl & Rebecca S. Williams, supra note 66, at
181 (2012) (“Public relations campaigns in 2010 by the Seneca Nation suggest the Nation
viewed the PACT Act as a threat from the start.”).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Compacts, U.S. DEP’T INT. INDIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 30, 2017). It should be noted that the implementation of gambling compacts between
states and tribes has not been flawless. Recently, the California legislature was sued by a
California tribe for failing to approve of a gambling contract “in good faith” when a governornegotiated compact was never voted on by the legislature, despite the tribe’s insistence, and
subsequently expired. Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe v. California, 163 F. Supp. 3d 769, 771, 781
(E.D. Cal. 2016).
93. See DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i34–i35.
94. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-14-204.5(2)(c)(ii) (West 2017).
95. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i35 tbl. 3.
96. CHALOUPKA ET AL., supra note 18, at 38.
97. See id. at 35.
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At the beginning of 2015, fourteen states used cigarette tax
compact schemes, including Washington, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota. 98 At least one other state—Kansas—has created compacts
since that time. 99
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TOBACCO CONTROL IN COMPACTS
Compacts are a potentially powerful tool for curbing illicit
cigarette dealings. This is because compacts bring tribal leaders to the
negotiating table, a process that is surely more likely than a state law
to motivate leaders to follow through on enforcement obligations.
However, compacts can curb the illicit cigarette trade more effectively
by ensuring that tribes receive meaningful benefits and earmarking
funds for tobacco prevention and control. In this Part, I will describe
two cigarette compacts and explain how compacts can be improved to
better incorporate elements of tribal sovereignty and public health.
A. A Tale of Two Compacts
In 2003, the State of Kansas faced a financial problem. There was
concern that four large cigarette companies would stop making
payments to the state under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement—
payments that were supposed to provide $60 million in annual funds
for state children’s programs and other causes—because of cigarette
tracking problems. 100 The state decided to fix this issue and focused
particularly on cigarette sales on Native American reservation land in
order to do so. 101
The State entered into two compacts in early 2016. 102 The first was
entered into with the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation on February

98. DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33–i34 tbl.2; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 7, at 128–29 box 5-4.
99. Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales and Taxation, 35 KAN. REG. 331,
349 (2016), https://www.kssos.org/pubs/register%5C2016%5CVol_35_No_16_April_21_20
16_pages_331-370.pdf.
100. See Melissa Hellman, 2 Tribes, State of Kansas Enter into Cigarette-Sale Compacts,
TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Apr. 7, 2016, 5:20 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2016-04-07/2-tribesstate-kansas-enter-cigarette-sale-compacts.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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17th of that year, 103 while the second was adopted by resolution with
the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska on February 22nd. 104
Although the purpose of this analysis is to examine the tribal
sovereignty and public health aspects of these two compacts, it will be
helpful to first describe each of these tribes and the nature of the
agreements that they were involved in creating.
1. The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation
The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation is a Kansas tribe that
originated near the Great Lakes. 105 After their land was illegally taken
from them, they were forced south to Kansas, where after twenty years
of negotiations, the tribe finally settled on a small plot of land.106
Today, about 5000 individuals are considered members of the tribe,107
though only about 700 of those members live on the reservation. 108
The tribe runs several businesses, including a casino, a golf course, and
a business entity devoted to diversifying the tribe’s economic
interests. 109 Nation members sell cigarettes through local
convenience stores. 110

103. Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales, Taxation and Escrow Collection
1, 20 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-17compact---prairie-band-signed.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Potawatomi Nation Compact]
(compact between Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation and the State of Kansas).
104. Compact Relating to Cigarette and Tobacco Sales and Taxation 1, 12 (Feb. 22,
2016), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-2-22-compact---iowa-tribesigned.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [hereinafter Iowa Tribe Compact] (compact between Iowa Tribe of Kansas
and Nebraska and the State of Kansas).
105. Tribal History, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.
com/tribal-history (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
106. See id.
107. Enrollment, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.pbpindiantribe.com
/enrollment/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
108. A Vision of Accomplishment, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www
.pbpindiantribe.com/vision-of-accomplishment.aspx [https://web.archive.org/web/2017032
4012908/http://www.pbpindiantribe.com/vision-of-accomplishment.aspx] (last visited Jan.
1, 2018).
109. Tribal Enterprises, PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION, http://www.
pbpindiantribe.com/enrollment [https://web.archive.org/web/20170324005727/http://
www.pbpindiantribe.com/tribal-enterprises.aspx] (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
110. Potawatomi Retail, PRAIRIE BAND LLC, http://prairiebandllc.com/Companies/
PotawatomiRetail.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
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2. The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska
The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska is one of two tribal
branches stemming from the Ioway tribe. 111 The other is the Iowa
Tribe of Oklahoma. 112 The Ioway Indians were at one time located in
the upper Midwest, 113 but over the course of time, travel, and dealings
with the United States government, 114 the geographic borders of the
Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska became restricted to the KansasNebraska border. 115 Like the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, the
Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska maintains a casino, but it also has
a farm and a gas station. 116 At the Grandview Oil convenience store
located on the tribal lands, the tribe sells Native American
manufacturer brands. 117
Knowing the background of these two tribes provides a basic lens
through which to view questions of tribal sovereignty and tobacco
control in cigarette compacting. Although these two tribes share
geographic ties now, they have two distinct geographical and
genealogical origins, with differing traditions and cultural
perspectives. This understanding will help frame some of the
differences between the two agreements these tribes established with
the Kansas state government in early 2016.
The remainder of this Part will examine the two cigarette
compacts these tribes negotiated with the State of Kansas, specifically
analyzing how these compacts treat tribal sovereignty and
tobacco control.

111. See MARTHA ROYCE BLAINE, THE IOWAY INDIANS (1979) (giving an overview of the
history and current state of the Ioway Indians).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 7.
114. The Ioway Indians, LEGENDS OF KANSAS, http://www.legendsofkansas.
com/iowayindians.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2018).
115. Id.; Ioway Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, BAXOJE, IOWAY NATION,
http://ioway.nativeweb.org/iowayksne.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
116. IOWA TRIBE OF KAN. AND NEB., http://iowatribeofkansasandnebraska.com/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2018) (follow “Tribal Enterprise” tab, click on each subheading for
more information).
117. Megan Hart, Gov. Sam Brownback: Changes to Reservation Tobacco Sales Needed to
Keep Settlement Money, TOPEKA CAP.-J., http://cjonline.com/news-business-local-state/201502-19/gov-sam-brownback-changes-reservation-tobacco-sales-needed-keep (last updated Feb.
20, 2015, 9:00 AM) (referencing tribal chairman, Tim Rhodd).
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B. Tribal Sovereignty
Compacts are a superior tool for combating illicit cigarette
dealings because they are formed only after Native American and state
leaders come together to create a solution that works for both parties.
In other words, compact-making, in theory, recognizes Native
American tribes and their members for what they truly are—
government leaders with independent, distinct powers and fellow
American citizens who deserve respect. This section will discuss what
tribal sovereignty is and why it matters in cigarette compacting.
Due to the complicated history between the United States and
Native American tribes, Native American tribes are essentially
considered quasi-distinct nations that have the right to govern
themselves. 118 Native American tribal governments existed before the
United States came into being, and their systems of governance have
never been entirely merged with or dissolved into the American
system. 119 Over the course of centuries, the United States’
acknowledgment of Native American sovereignty has been established
and re-emphasized through government treaties, court rulings, and
legislation. 120 Even in the U.S. Constitution, Native American tribes
are acknowledged as entities distinct from states and foreign
governments. 121 It is for these reasons that, as Sandra Day O’Connor
once explained: “Today, in the United States, we have three types of
sovereign entities—[T]he Federal government, the states, and the
Indian tribes. Each of the[se] sovereigns . . . plays an important role .

118. See generally Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal
Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule (Harv. Univ., Working Paper No.
RWP04-016, 2004).
119. Lindsay Cutler, Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Court Legitimacy, and Public Defense, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1755 (2016). See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
120. Gavin Clarkson & Jim Sebenius, Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty for Economic
Opportunity: A Strategic Negotiations Perspective, 76 MO. L. REV. 1045, 1048–55 (2011).
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress’s power includes the right “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
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. . in this country.” 122 Today, Native American tribes have their own
court systems, laws, and tax systems. 123
Unfortunately, state and federal leaders sometimes undervalue
potential partnerships that they can form with peers in tribal
leadership. This has been demonstrated numerous times—for
example, the United States government has tried to eliminate tribal
leadership by assimilating Native Americans into Western culture124
and has sold tribal land without consent. 125 Other Native American
tribes have been forcibly relocated from their homes and livelihoods
for dam construction, 126 had pro-Native American laws criticized as
unfair, 127 and experienced difficulties obtaining federal recognition.128
According to one writer, the government’s micromanagement of
Indian affairs has made it difficult for tribes to develop economically
due to the amount of red tape involved in permitting and business
development. 129 And in 2016, protesters accused the Army Corps of
Engineers of failing to consult with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of
North Dakota before permitting a nearby massive oil pipeline that
threatened their water supply and sacred sites. 130
When events like these happen—i.e., when a state or federal entity
attempts to regulate tribal actions or skirt around tribal policies with
its own laws—government officials disrespect tribal leadership, impede

122. Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1056 (alteration in original) (quoting
Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1,
1 (1997)).
123. See Kalt & Singer, supra note 118, at 16–17.
124. Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1055.
125. Id. at 1049–50.
126. Trymaine Lee, No Man’s Land: The Last Tribes of the Plains, MSNBC, http://
www.msnbc.com/interactives/geography-of-poverty/nw.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
127. Howard Fischer, Arizona Court Rules Against Tribe in Adoption Case, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR (Aug. 12, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/arizona-court-rulesagainst-tribe-in-adoption-case/article_4726989a-e65b-5653-833f-1667c4ff3506.html.
128. Associated Press, Judge Greenlights Tribe’s Suit Against State, NATIVE TIMES (Oct.
28, 2016), http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/news/tribal/13928-judge-greenlightstribe-s-suit-against-state-2.
129. Shawn Regan, 5 Ways the Government Keeps Native Americans in Poverty, FORBES
(Mar. 13, 2014, 6:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/5-ways-thegovernment-keeps-native-americans-in-poverty/#1e4ec82d6cc6.
130. Brad Plumer, The Battle Over the Dakota Access Pipeline, Explained, VOX (Nov. 29,
2016, 5:47 PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/9/9/12862958/dakota-access-pipeline-fight.
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the tribe’s economic and political independence, and prevent
opportunities for state-tribe alliances to form.
When tribal sovereignty is respected, on the other hand, tribes can
become powerful state allies. The experience of the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Nation 131 illustrates this point well. Beginning with the
Pequot War in the 1630s and continuing through subsequent
struggles with the government, the Nation’s once-bustling
community of 8000 members continually shrank. 132 By the 1950s, the
Pequots were so run down by federal and state government action
that only one of its members still resided on the reservation.133
However, after members started to push back and negotiate the return
of stolen land, the government agreed to give that land, and some
additional payment, back to the Nation. 134 As a result, members
started returning to the reservation and the Nation became more
prosperous. 135 Recently, the Mashantucket Pequot tribe has provided
economic support to the State of Connecticut. 136 It is likely that when
states more fully recognize tribal sovereignty, tribes will operate more
successfully on their own and become more valuable political and
economic partners.
In cigarette tax compacting, tribal sovereignty is particularly
important. It is clear that, as sovereigns, tribal leaders deserve space at
the negotiating table for political dealings involving their land.
Moreover, tribes that are given that space are more likely to cooperate
in negotiations and enforcement. 137 Furthermore, tribes that

131. Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1049; Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET
(WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, https://www.mptn-nsn.gov/tribalhistory.aspx (last
visited Jan. 12, 2019).
132. Tribal History, supra note 131.
133. Clarkson & Sebenius, supra note 120, at 1049.
134. Id. at 1050.
135. Id. But see Tatiana Schlossberg, A Connecticut Indian Tribe Faces Its Eroding Fortunes
from Foxwoods, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/
nyregion/pequot-indian-tribe-faces-its-eroding-fortunes-from-foxwoods.html?_r=0.
136. Foxwoods Hits $4 Billion Lifetime Contribution to CT with June Slot Revenue, E.
CONN. CHAMBER OF COM. (July 15, 2017), http://info.chamberect.com/news/details/
foxwoods-resort-casino-hits-4-billion-lifetime-contribution-to-connecticut-with-june-slot-reve
nue-07-15-2017.
137. Although this may seem like a commonsense assumption, it should also be noted that
some research bolsters this assumption by suggesting that hierarchical relationships impede
cooperation. Katherine A. Cronin et al., Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation, 5
SCI. REP. 1 (2015).
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benefit from negotiations become more self-sufficient, stronger
allies generally.
Some states might fear creating cigarette compacts with tribes
under the assumption that the cigarette trade provides tribes with a
critical source of revenue. However, the cigarette trade has not
provided a perfect solution to tribal economic problems in recent
years. In the Seneca Nation, where the cigarette industry is very large,
one study showed that profits from cigarette sales benefited only a few
members of the tribe while many remained in poverty. 138 It is because
of scenarios like these that some tribes disfavor keeping the cigarette
trade on tribal land. 139 Like all communities, tribes want to be
economically independent and healthy, and the cigarette trade is not
a long-term vehicle that will meet those needs.
It is likely that tribal leaders who are heard, respected, and
benefited in compact negotiations are more likely to serve as effective
allies in the fight against illicit cigarette dealings than those who are
not. While states that engage in compacting generally already show
respect for tribal leadership by bringing tribal leaders to the
negotiating table, compacts can be improved by better protecting and
promoting tribal interests. The remainder of this Part will discuss how
the two Kansas compacts under review discuss tribal sovereignty and
then suggest how considerations of tribal sovereignty can be bolstered
even further.
It should be noted that although a tribe’s treatment in a compact
may not translate to a tribe’s treatment in real life, the language used
to describe a tribe in a compact is important because it provides a
foundation for compact formation and interpretation and serves as a
model for future policymaking. Therefore, this analysis will critique
even the smallest details—such as the use or placement of words in
these compacts—to determine how compacts treat tribal sovereignty.
1. Tribal sovereignty in the Potawatomi Nation compact
The Potawatomi Nation cigarette compact’s description of tribal
sovereignty is impressive. The compact’s very first recital boldly
addresses the subject with this statement: “[T]he [Potawatomi]
Nation is a federally-recognized Indian tribe possessing and exercising
138.
139.

Samuel, Ribisl & Williams, supra note 66, at 177.
Id.
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inherent sovereign powers of self-government, as defined and
recognized by treaties, federal laws and federal court decisions,
and . . . it has responsibilities and needs similar to other governments
. . . .” 140 The second recital contains a parallel statement on the State,141
which effectively serves to place the Potawatomi Nation and Kansas
leadership on equal ground.
The recitals on the importance of tribal leadership continue,
explaining that “it is in the best interests of both the State and the
Nation to prevent [cigarette-related] disputes,” paying tribute to “the
financial, cultural, educational, and economic contributions” of each
group, and noting that each group “supports the other’s
governmental responsibilities to provide for and govern its citizens,
members and territory.” 142
In the main portion of the compact, the wording and substance
of the Nation’s requirements reflect the State’s respect for the
Nation. 143 For example, although the compact requires the Nation to
regulate cigarette sales and taxes on its own, 144 the State agrees not to
impose any of its own taxes on cigarettes that tribal retailers sell 145 as
long as the Potawatomi Nation maintains certain minimum cigarette
tax rates. 146 And, in terms of auditing services, Kansas and Potawatomi
Nation officials work together to contract with an independent
auditor and split the auditor’s bill evenly. 147 These types of freedoms
give the Potawatomi Nation breathing room to set its own tax rates
and regulate its own sales.
2. Tribal sovereignty in the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and
Nebraska compact
Interestingly, the list of recitals in the compact made between
Kansas and the Iowa Nation of Kansas and Nebraska is a flipped
version of the State’s compact with the Potawatomi Nation. The

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 4.01, 5.01.
Id. § 4.01.
Id. § 5.01(a).
Id. § 5.01(b)–(d) (setting minimum requirements for sales taxes and excise taxes).
Id. § 6.02.
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language is often very similar, but in a different order: this compact
does not explicitly reference tribal sovereignty until the ninth recital. 148
Instead, the first part of the compact focuses heavily on the battle
between the State of Kansas and various tobacco companies. 149
This recital portrays the State of Kansas as the main actor in this
compact who, fighting against the abuses of the tobacco industry,
must reach out to the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska for
assistance. 150 This portrayal places the tribe in a third-party position in
the recital narrative rather than as an equal partner in a contract. The
narrative further paints this picture by assuring readers that any tribal
efforts to assist the State in its fight will be reimbursed. 151
This treatment of tribal independence and power in the recital is
paired, interestingly, with a brief main compact body. 152 Although this
compact negotiates the same type of arrangement as the Potawatomi
Nation compact, it is significantly shorter. 153 The length difference is
due partly to the fact that the Potawatomi compact has its own
definitions section. 154
The Tribe seems to be treated fairly in the compact’s main
provisions. For example, this agreement asserts that the Tribe and
State will work together to hire an auditor. 155 The section of the
contract regarding interpretation of terms explains that “[i]t is the
intent of the parties that this Compact shall be construed to reflect
that the parties are of equal stature and dignity and have dealt with
each other at arm’s length.” 156 The Iowa Tribe compact also states that
the Tribe has the exclusive right to tax buyers on tribal land as long as

148. Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104.
149. Id. art. I.
150. Id. art. I (“[I]t would be contrary to the policy of Kansas if tobacco product
manufacturers who determine not to enter into such a settlement could use a resulting cost
advantage to derive large, short-term profits in the years before liability may arise without
ensuring that Kansas will have an eventual source of recovery from them if they are proven to
have acted culpably . . . [and] Kansas entered into a settlement agreement with certain [tobacco
product manufacturers] . . . .”).
151. Id. art. I (recitals 7–8). But see art. III, § 10.
152. Id. arts. II–III.
153. Id.; Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103.
154. Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. III, § 11; Potawatomi Nation Compact,
supra note 103, art. I.
155. Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. II, § 9.
156. Id. art. III, § 10.
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those taxes exceed 17 cents per pack or $1.70 for ten. 157 This contract
also explicitly omits sacred tobacco from the requirements of the
compact, 158 which accommodates and facilitates the Tribe’s expression
of religious beliefs. Therefore, although tribal sovereignty is not
placed at the forefront of the compact’s introduction, the tribe seems
to have negotiated several fair terms for itself in the body of
the compact.
3. Critique of tribal sovereignty in the Potawatomi Nation and Iowa
Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska compacts
In a way, both the Potawatomi Nation and Iowa Tribe of Kansas
and Nebraska compacts incorporate ideas of tribal sovereignty.
However, despite the fact that both compacts use identical sovereignty
provisions, the placement of those statements impacts their respective
narratives in important ways. 159 The Potawatomi Nation compact
begins with a powerful assertion of the rights and independent
governing powers of the local tribe. 160 The Iowa Tribe compact leaves
its discussion of tribal sovereignty to the end of the introduction,
focusing primarily on the battle between Kansas and the tobacco
industry. 161 This difference in treatment may be trivial, but rhetorically
it creates in the mind of the reader two opposite impressions—in one,
the tribe is an important player in compact formation, but in the other,
the tribe is a means to an end.
Both compacts treat tribal sovereignty appropriately on a practical
level, and this is something that all cigarette compacts must do. Of
course, the mere fact that the State used a compact rather than a
statute to bring about cigarette tax reform signals that the State viewed
these tribes as worthy of meeting at the negotiating table. In addition,
these compacts are particularly impressive because both give tribes
significant leeway to set their own taxes and keep those taxes for tribal
use. 162 These two provisions, independent tax-setting and within-tribe
use of taxes, show respect for tribes as independent entities.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
note 104.
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Id. art. II, §§ 10–13.
Id. art. II, § 3; see also Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, § 5.02(h).
See supra Sections IV.B.1–B.2.
See Potawatomi Nation Contract, supra note 103.
See Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See Potawatomi Nation Contract, supra note 103; Iowa Tribe Compact, supra
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Overall, these two compacts, while differing in their narrative
style, both promote tribal sovereignty to some extent. In addition, the
Potawatomi Nation compact sets up the tribe as an equally important
partner with the State; in so doing, the compact helps to unify both
governments in the fight against cigarette bootlegging. Future
compacts should assert tribal sovereignty early on and ensure that
tribes are receiving adequate consideration for the help they provide
to states: doing so promotes tribal economy and fosters the spirit
of cooperation helpful in combating illicit cigarette dealings
involving tribes.
C. Tobacco Control
Both states and tribes stand to gain by making cigarette compacts
as effective as possible from a public health perspective. The staggering
economic and public health burden of smoking on states is already
well known, 163 and cigarette smoking is also a large problem on Native
American lands. For example, Native American adults have the highest
prevalence of commercial tobacco product use in the country (over
forty percent in one 2013 study) 164 and experience high death rates
from multiple related chronic diseases. 165 Many also live in stifling
poverty, 166 which is likely exacerbated by the need to purchase
cigarettes. With this in mind, states and tribes should be actively
engaged in forming agreements that combat illicit cigarette dealings
and, by implication, the population’s dependence on tobacco, as
effectively as possible.
163. See, e.g., The Costs of Tobacco on NY State, N.Y. STATE SMOKERS’ QUITLINE,
https://www.nysmokefree.com/EMP/EMPSubpage.aspx?Pn=TOBACOCOSTS (last visited
Dec. 2, 2017) (“Adults who die each year in New York from their own smoking: 25,500 . . .
Annual smoking-related health care costs and lost productivity in NY total $14.2 billion[.]”).
164. American Indians/Alaska Natives and Tobacco Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (citing Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed
Tables, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. tbl. 2.26B, http://www.
samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs2013/NSDUHDetTabs2013.htm#ta
b2.26b (last visited Dec. 2, 2017)), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/disparities/americanindians/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2017)
165. David K. Espey et al., Leading Causes of Death and All-Cause Mortality in American
Indians and Alaska Natives, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S303, S307–09 (2014), http://
ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301798.
166. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native Americans and Alaska Natives are
Living in Poverty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-and-alaska-natives-are-living-in-poverty/.
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Although some may assume tribes are not interested in tobacco
prevention because of the use of traditional tobacco, that assumption
would be misguided. 167 First, not all tribes use traditional tobacco168
and traditional tobacco has a special religious purpose that is often
considered distinct from that of commercial tobacco. 169 Second, while
some tribes have taken to using commercial tobacco for religious
ceremonies, a movement among Native Americans has grown in an
effort to correct that practice. 170 Third, there are tribes that recognize
the public health dangers of the commercial cigarette trade. 171
Therefore, some tribes may be very much interested in earmarking
cigarette revenue for tobacco control.
The two compacts analyzed here divide tax revenue and do not
limit how that revenue can be spent. 172 A more effective way to combat
illicit cigarette dealings is to require each party to use cigarette taxes
for tobacco control efforts. After all, one of the easiest ways to curb
practices like bootlegging is to reduce a population’s dependence on
and interest in cigarettes.
If cigarette tax revenue is dedicated to anti-smoking efforts, the
resulting revenue could have a significant impact on both the
prevalence of smoking, and, by consequence, the incidence of illicit
cigarette dealings. This type of effort is likely most effective when
both parties earmark any funds coming from the compact for tobacco
control. The purpose of this section is to analyze the extent to which
tribal tobacco control is discussed in these two Kansas compacts.
1. Compact with the Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska
Smoking-related health plays an interesting role in the opening
recitals of the Iowa Tribe compact. The main narrative of this opening
167. See, e.g., Smoking, Race and Ethnicity: Tobacco Use and Native Americans, TOBACCO
FREE LIFE, https://tobaccofreelife.org/resources/smoking-among-native-americans/ (last
visited Dec. 2, 2017) (“With numerous ceremonial uses for tobacco and a deeply ingrained
cultural tradition, . . . Native Americans have a particularly big problem with smoking and
comparatively less motivation to quit.”).
168. Traditional vs. Commercial Tobacco, KEEP IT SACRED NATIONAL NATIVE
NETWORK, http://keepitsacred.itcmi.org/tobacco-and-tradition/traditional-v-commercial/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
169. See id.
170. See id. (referring to the “Keep it Sacred” Native Network itself).
171. Samuel, Ribisl & Williams, supra note 66, at 177.
172. See, e.g., infra Sections IV.C.1–C.2.
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focuses on Kansas’s fight against tobacco companies. Rather than
emphasizing that industry payments are needed to stop smoking, the
agreement specifies that Kansas needs money to deal with the
consequences of smoking. 173 The first recital explicitly states that “it is
in the best interests of the State of Kansas . . . to continue to reduce
the financial burdens imposed on [it] by cigarette smoking and that
said costs continue to be borne by tobacco product manufacturers,”174
while the third explains that payments from tobacco companies are
meant to serve as a form of pre-emptive “recovery” in case these
companies are found liable for abuse. 175 The purpose, then, is not to
prevent smoking—either on reservations or within the State—but to
mitigate its effects.
The fact that tobacco control principles are avoided in this
introduction is further emphasized by the compact’s second recital,
which contains the only explicit compact reference to public health.176
The compact explains that members of the tobacco industry who are
not part of the Master Settlement Agreement “pay substantial sums to
Kansas . . . to fund a national foundation devoted to . . . public health;
and . . . make substantial changes in their advertising and marketing
practices and corporate culture, with the intention of reducing
underage smoking.” 177 This summary of the Master Settlement
Agreement is helpful background for this compact because it shows
that both public health and tobacco control are central principles
behind tobacco industry payments to the State.
Unfortunately, tobacco control is not mentioned elsewhere in the
compact. 178 No sales tax funds are explicitly earmarked for smoking

173. See Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104, art. I.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104. It should be noted that there are references in
both the Iowa Tribe Compact and the Potawatomi Nation Compact to statutes and agreements
that do talk more explicitly about public health and tobacco, such as the 2012 Term Sheet
Settlement, which describes payments that tribes can use for public health generally and not for
certain pro-smoking purposes. Id. art. II, § 14; Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103,
§ 1.01 (“Secondary Settlement Agreement”); 2012 Term Sheet Settlement § 3(B)(2)(d).
However, the author was not able to find any specific, proactive tobacco control funding use
requirements in outside references that would be mandatory for tribes to implement.
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prevention on reservation lands in the compact itself. 179 The omission
may suggest that the compact is motivated more strongly by financial
gain than by tobacco-focused public health considerations. 180
2. The Potawatomi Nation compact
Of course, if the Iowa Tribe compact can be considered
minimalistic in its treatment of public health, the Potawatomi Nation
compact can be as well. Both compacts share the same public health
and smoking clauses. 181 However, in the case of the Potawatomi
Nation compact, the public health and smoking provisions are buried
twelve recitals into the introduction, 182 suggesting that its use of funds
to prevent smoking is a side-goal rather than a main objective. And,
as in the Iowa Tribe compact, no explicit mention of tobacco control
earmarking was found elsewhere in the document. 183
3. Critique of tobacco control in these two compacts
These two Kansas compacts point to the ideal purpose behind
cigarette taxes but could potentially do more to promote that purpose.
If tobacco control is truly a motivator for cigarette taxes and compacts,
those funds should be used for some kind of anti-smoking aim.
Otherwise, those taxes become a source of revenue, which makes
states and tribes beneficiaries of the tobacco industry. In other words,
when policymakers’ funded state programs rely on smoker tax revenue
to continue, there is no incentive to see smokers quit. 184
There are several changes policymakers can make to better
incorporate public health and tribal sovereignty themes into cigarette
tax compacts. The next section provides these recommendations.

179. Iowa Tribe Compact, supra note 104.
180. Id.
181. Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, art. I.; Iowa Tribe Compact, supra
note 104, art. I.
182. Potawatomi Nation Compact, supra note 103, art. I.
183. Id. There is also evidence that the Potawatomi Nation did not intend to use funding
from the agreement exclusively for tobacco control. Hellman, supra note 100 (“Her tribe also
will get a small tobacco payment from the Master Settlement Agreement, which Onnen said will
likely go toward the tribe’s general fund or to health center operations.”).
184. See generally May, supra note 50.
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V. IMPROVING COMPACTS: FOUR SUGGESTIONS
The way tribal sovereignty and public health are addressed in
compacts affects their potential effectiveness in combating the illicit
cigarette market. If tribes are not respected, it is unlikely that they will
cooperate with state governments. If public health is not placed at the
heart of compacting, neither states nor tribes will be incentivized to
actively promote anti-smoking efforts.
This Part makes four recommendations to help states keep tribal
sovereignty and public health at the heart of cigarette tax compacting
and the fight against illicit cigarette dealings.
1. States should codify rules for compact formation.
2. Compact introductions should explicitly focus on tribal
sovereignty and smoking prevention.
3. State taxes should be kept out of the reservation.
4. Both the state and the tribe should earmark tax proceeds
for smoking prevention and cessation programs in
compacts.
A. Codify Rules for Compact Formation
States can and should form compacts with Native American tribes
whenever possible, and an effective way to ensure that state and tribal
leaders work together is to mandate compact formation legislatively
(either on the state or federal level). Multiple states have already done
this. 185 At the beginning of 2015, fourteen states had legislation in
place that specifically authorized the use of state-tribal cigarette
compacts, including Washington, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. 186
Washington’s compacting law 187 illustrates how beneficial codified
compacting rules can be for state-tribe relations. Under this law, the
governor is authorized to make cigarette compacts with Native
American tribes. 188 The law also lays out some of the basic terms of
those compacts, 189 so the governor can do the legislature’s will while

185. E.g., DeLong et al., supra note 52, at i33–i34.
186. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 128–29; DeLong et al., supra note 52,
at i34 tbl 2.
187. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06.460 (West 2009).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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still retaining enough flexibility to work with individual tribes. In so
doing, the legislature streamlined the process of compact formation
and showed tribes that they valued state-tribe cooperation. 190
Of course, creating laws that regulate compact formation can be
problematic if they are too loose or too restrictive, so legislators need
to strike a careful balance between the two. States that choose to set
rules on these kinds of compacts should make rules strong enough to
meet public health goals but flexible enough to allow tribes to
negotiate terms. The Washington law, for example, sets a minimum
standard cigarette rate for compacts. 191 That minimum rate may be too
low to prevent bootlegging, or, in some cases, it might be considered
too high to agree to. Therefore, states should create restrictions based
on sound economic and public health research in order to most
effectively combat bootlegging through mandated compacts.
B. Focus Compact Recitals on Tribal Sovereignty
and Smoking Prevention
In the two Kansas compacts evaluated earlier, the Potawatomi
Nation’s recital read like an economic agreement between sovereigns,
while the Iowa Tribe’s recital read like a state fight against the tobacco
industry that required tribal assistance. 192 A clear description of the
role of tribal sovereignty and smoking prevention in cigarette
compacting would not have had a direct legal impact on these
compacts, but they would have provided a helpful guide for compact
drafters, interpreters, and other tribes interested in producing their
own agreements.
One example of a hybrid purpose statement that incorporates both
tribal sovereignty and public health elements is located in Washington
State’s law authorizing cigarette tax negotiations with the Puyallup
tribe. 193 In that statute, the legislature explains its purpose is to “(a)
[produce] an increase in prices through a flat tax [that] will reduce
much of the competitive advantage that has historically existed due to
190. WASH. H.R. 59-5794, 1st Sess., at 2 (2005) (“This bill will end the dispute between
the Puyallup Tribe and the state over cigarette taxes. It is a cooperative approach between the
tribe and the Department of Revenue. It is good for the state and the tribe. It recognizes unique
factors that apply to the Puyallup Tribe’s situation.”).
191. § 43.06.460; see also supra note 31.
192. See supra Part IV.
193. WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06.465 (West 2017).
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the discrepancy in the difference between state and tribal taxes, and
(b) [ensure] that . . . tribal retailers . . . remain in business under the
changed circumstances.” 194 Although this contractual language does
not explicitly mention the public health benefits of minimizing statetribe tax differentials (through the prevention of illicit cigarette
dealings), the fact that this agreement focuses on those differentials
while still considering the needs of tribal retailers shows both public
health considerations and tribal sovereignty can be appropriately
incorporated in the same statute.
Cigarette tax compacts are agreements between two sovereign
entities that should have a tobacco control motive. An ideal compact
should pair a strong introduction on tribal sovereignty with an equally
powerful discussion on the purpose of cigarette taxes in promoting
public health.
C. Keep State Taxes at the Reservation
Even when a compact includes a firm statement of purpose, that
stated purpose means nothing unless the body of the compact carries
through on that compact’s mission. In terms of tribal sovereignty, this
means a state should not try to reach into tribal retailer pockets to pick
up taxes that the state thinks should belong to itself. Although, as
previously mentioned, it is legal for states to collect taxes on cigarettes
sold to nonresidents, 195 such a practice could also be considered
overreaching. As tribal chairwoman Liana Onnen of the Potawatomi
Nation explains, “We use terms like self-determination and
sovereignty . . . . It’s that ability to self-govern and to self-determine
how we’re going to handle our taxing and our business.” 196
The Kansas compacts, which keep tribal taxes on the reservation,
are not the only documents that support tribal taxing independence.
Washington’s law on cigarette compact formation specifies that tribes
forming compacts with the State can set their own tax rates “in lieu of
the state cigarette and state and local sales and use taxes.” 197

194. § 43.06.465(1).
195. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160 (1980).
196. See Hellman, supra note 100.
197. § 43.06.460.
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D. Mutually Earmark Tax Proceeds
for Smoking Prevention and Cessation
Cigarette taxes have the potential to curb smoking rates, and the
purpose of compacting is to prevent state users from circumventing
those taxes. Tobacco prevention and control, therefore, lie at the heart
of this kind of legislation, and they must remain at the heart of any
related agreements if they are to have their intended effect on illicit
cigarette dealings. Although state and tribal sovereignty both need to
be respected, both states and tribes must acknowledge the power they
have to incentivize the other to act.
In compact-making, both states and tribes should ensure that a
substantial portion of tax revenue is earmarked for public health
purposes in general and for smoking prevention and control in
particular. This means that funds not only should be allocated
specifically to that purpose but also should be prohibited from shifting
back to the tobacco industry. In the case of Native American tribes,
who may experience economic hardship as a result of cigarette tax
increases, additional funds should also be used to spur non-tobaccorelated industries.
Although both states and tribes should do this of their own
accord, each group has opportunities in compacting to incentivize the
other to dedicate tax proceeds to smoking control. The State of
Nevada did this to some extent in legislation authorizing its own statetribe cigarette tax compacts. 198 According to Nevada law, the money
that tribes receive from their own state-tribe cigarette agreements
must go to “public safety on the qualified tribal land of the tribe or
[to] social services for tribal members, including . . . health care or
education, and not [to] any function that could directly or indirectly
promote or reduce the costs of cigarette production, marketing
or sales.” 199
In the case of the Kansas compacts discussed earlier, the State
needed tribal assistance in order to continue to receive funds from the
tobacco industry. The Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska and the
Potawatomi Nation both could have put pressure on the State to
earmark state funds for tobacco prevention and control, and vice versa.

198. NEV. REV. STAT. § 370A.157 (2015).
199. Id.; see also TERM SHEET § III(B)(2)(d) (2012), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/
agweb/pdfs/tobacco/term_sheet.pdf.
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Tribes and states involved in compacting should consider making
mutual agreements to allocate cigarette tax funds to tobacco control.
VI. CONCLUSION
State-tribe compacting can be a powerful tool for preventing illicit
cigarette dealings. However, not all compacts are created equal, and
in at least some cases, tribal sovereignty and tobacco control do not
seem to be playing as strong a role as they should be in compact
formation. By showing respect for tribal sovereignty, tribes can
become stronger allies in tobacco control enforcement efforts. By
allocating compact funds to effective tobacco control programs, both
parties can curb the market for illicit cigarette trading. States need to
create legislation that encourages state leaders to develop compacts
with Native American tribes, ideally for all state-tribal issues, but
specifically for cigarette tax compacts. In those compacts, public
health and tribal sovereignty should be featured prominently in
compact purpose statements. And, in the main body of these
compacts, states and tribes should work together to produce a system
where tribes tax members and nonmembers for cigarettes and then
keep all revenue. The proceeds of those taxes, in addition to the taxes
from state cigarette taxes on state land, should all go toward tobacco
prevention and control.
This four-part strategy should create strong state-tribal
partnerships that discourage the growth of the illicit cigarette trade,
keep cigarette taxes high, and discourage smoking in the population.
Public health and tribal sovereignty are not enemies in cigarette tax
compacting. Both tribal leadership and states can acknowledge each
other’s taxing power and use their own power to incentivize fund
expenditure for what it should cover—tobacco prevention
and control.
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